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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL 
DISTRESS IN MONTANA 
Carl Tobias· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The independent cause of action for the intentional infliction 
of mental distress (IIMD) in substantive tort law has enjoyed a 
short, somewhat confused history in the United States and in 
Montana. California became the first state to recognize this 
freestanding cause of action in the landmark 1952 decision of 
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff. 1 Virtually all jurisdic-
tions in the United States now recognize the intentional inflic-
tion cause of action. 
In several recent opinions, the Montana Supreme Court 
indicated its willingness to recognize the independent tort, even 
as the court stated that no plaintiff had presented a factual situ-
ation which would satisfy the elements of the cause of action.2 
In the 1995 case of Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, 
Inc.,3 the Montana Supreme Court held that an "independent 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress will 
arise under circumstances where serious or severe emotional 
distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant's intentional act or omission. "4 
The Montana Supreme Court's Sacco opinion improved, 
principally by clarifying, the law of IIMD in Montana in several 
important respects. For example, the court correctly recognized 
the existence of an independent cause of action and properly 
clarified the meaning of the severe emotional distress element of 
the claim by relying substantially on the definition included in 
comment j, Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Notwithstanding the Montana Supreme Court's comprehensive 
treatment of the intentional infliction of mental distress tort and 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Bari Burke, Peg-
gy Sanner, Justin Stark, and the first year torts class at the University of Montana 
for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this 
piece, and Ann and Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing sup-
port. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952). 
2. See, e.g., Foster v. Albertsons, Inc., 254 Mont. 117, 835 P.2d 720 (1992); 
Doohan v. Bigfork Sch. Dist. No. 38, 247 Mont. 125, 805 P.2d 1354 (1991); see also 
Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411, 426-27 
(1995). 
3. 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411 (1995). 
4. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 237, 896 P.2d at 428. 
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its careful attempt to clarify the applicable law, some confusion 
remains. 
With all due respect for the valuable efforts of the court, I 
believe that there is a preferable approach to this complicated 
area of substantive tort law. The solution that I proffer is the 
recognition of an independent cause of action for IIMD which 
relies on the elements of the tort that comprise the cause of 
action in the majority of American jurisdictions: the plaintiff 
would be required to show that the defendant engaged in unper-
mitted, intentional, extremely outrageous conduct which caused 
the plaintiff severe emotional distress. 
The two critical constituents of the cause of action should be 
articulated in terms of the concepts prescribed in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, which courts in the overwhelming major-
ity of states have elaborated and made more specific when apply-
ing the cause of action to particular cases. For instance, a useful 
starting point for enunciating extremely outrageous conduct is 
the Restatement and many courts' articulation of conduct which 
exceeds all bounds that could be tolerated by a reasonable soci-
ety.5 A valuable point of departure for defining severe mental 
distress would correspondingly be the ideas included in comment 
j, Section 46 of the Restatement (Second), some aspects of which 
the Sacco court reproduced verbatim and apparently adopted. 6 
The alternative proposed would simultaneously be clearer, 
easier for appellate and trial judges to apply, and more precise, 
while it would resemble more closely the legal standards that 
govern the tort in many other states. The option would also be 
more responsive to certain public policy problems, namely pro-
tecting defendants against unlimited liability and those parties 
and courts against a possible flood of fraudulent or fictitious 
claims, which have made some judges reluctant to recognize the 
IIMD tort. Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court expressed con-
cern about these very policy difficulties, even as the require-
ments relating to the cause of action that the court enunciated 
could ironically encourage the complications. 
Because the Montana Supreme Court has substantially 
clarified the law pertaining to the independent cause of action 
for IIMD in the Sacco opinion, but some problems remain, the 
5. See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 380 A2d 611, 613 (Md. 1977); Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 
at 284-86; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1964); see also Foster, 254 
Mont. at 128-29, 835 P.2d at 728. 
6. See Sacco, 271 Mont. at 234, 237, 896 P.2d at 426, 428. 
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Sacco decision warrants analysis. This essay undertakes that 
effort. I first briefly examine relevant historical information. The 
paper then evaluates Sacco. Finding that the Montana Supreme 
Court has greatly improved the law governing IIMD, I afford 
suggestions which should additionally clarify this complex cause 
of action. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
MENTAL DISTRESS TORT 
A. National Developments 
The American Law Institute (ALI), when drafting the First 
Restatement of Torts, stated that the interest in emotional and 
mental tranquillity alone was not significant enough to warrant 
recognition of a cause of action for its violation.7 The ALI adopt-
ed a 1948 Supplement to the Restatement in which it recognized 
an independent cause of action for IIMD.8 The Institute reversed 
its earlier position, finding that the "interest in freedom from 
severe emotional distress is regarded as of sufficient importance 
to require others to refrain from conduct intended to invade it. "9 
The ALI, when prescribing the Restatement (Second) in 1965, 
retained liability for extreme and outrageous conduct and left 
open the possibility of the tort's additional expansion.10 
The California Supreme Court, in the landmark Siliznoff 
case, became the first jurisdiction in the United States to recog-
nize the independent cause of action in 1952. 11 A clear majority 
of states in the nation now recognizes the independent cause of 
action. 12 Most do not require that physical consequences attend 
the mental distress that plaintiffs suffer, although some states 
have restricted the tort's application to circumstances in which 
7. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1934); see also Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 
at 285; see generally Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the 
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous 
Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982) (considering the definition of outrageousness 
and the practical difficulty of the IIMD cause of action and supplying the relevant 
history of the tort). 
8. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948); see also JOHN W. WADE ET 
AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 51 n.7 (9th ed. 
1994); Siliznoff, 240 P.2d at 285-86. 
9. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (Supp. 1948). 
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 caveat (1964). 
11. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952). 
12. See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 613 & n.1 (Md. 1977); Givelber, supra 
note 7, at 43 & n.9. 
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plaintiffs could prove physical harm 13 and other jurisdictions 
have seemed more comfortable when physical injuries accompa-
nied the mental suffering. 14 
Most states articulate the cause of action in terms of two 
principal elements-extremely outrageous conduct and severe 
mental distress-which are elevated. Many jurisdictions define 
extremely outrageous conduct as behavior that exceeds all 
bounds tolerated by a reasonable society. Numerous courts also 
recognize two major types of cases which satisfy this definition. 
One category of suits implicates "abuse of relation," usually re-
specting economic or physical power; much of this litigation is 
between employees and employers, tenants and landlords, and 
insured individuals and insurers. 15 The other classification in-
volves a plaintiff who is particularly vulnerable to suffering 
mental distress and a defendant who knows of, and plays upon, 
that special susceptibility.16 
The facts in Harris v. Jones 11 afford a classic illustration of 
these two categories. In that case, the plaintiff was a twenty-six 
year old assembly-line worker with a high school education who 
had stuttered all of his life. 18 Defendants were General Motors 
and its supervisory employee, Jones, who taunted Harris by 
mimicking his stuttering some thirty times in a five-month peri-
od, even though Jones knew that his actions would exacerbate 
Harris' condition.19 Beyond these two relatively clear classifica-
tions, courts have encountered considerable difficulty in defining 
with specificity what constitutes extremely outrageous conduct. 
This means that the standard can be a highly generalized one 
which judges and juries may interpret differently in specific 
states and even within particular jurisdictions. 
Severe mental distress, the second major element of the 
cause of action, is also rather difficult to define. Most courts 
treat the standard as an elevated one, and many states apply 
13. See, e.g, Duty v. General Fin. Co., 273 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. 1952). 
14. See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 
1939). 
15. See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977) (employer-employee); 
Kaufman v. Abramson, 363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1964). 
16. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970); Korbin v. 
Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1964). 
17. 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977). 
18. Harris, 380 A.2d at 612. 
19. Id. 
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formulations which draw on the language in comment j, Section 
46 of the Restatement (Second). This comment and many courts 
agree that the distress must be extreme, out of the ordinary, or 
so serious that reasonable people could not endure it.20 The Re-
statement and courts also speak in terms of severely disabling 
distress21 and of ''highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as 
fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, 
chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea."22 
B. Montana Developments 
The ongms and development of the independent cause of 
action for IIMD warrant relatively limited treatment in this 
essay for several reasons. Other writers in earlier issues of this 
journal have examined considerable, relevant background.23 
Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court has addressed the con-
cept of mental distress in numerous contexts. A small number of 
the cases, however, involved IIMD, and the court only recognized 
the independent cause of action in a few recent cases, while it 
deemed the facts in none of them sufficient to support a cause of 
action. 
Johnson v. Supersave Markets24 technically involved negli-
gent, not intentional, infliction of mental distress, but the deci-
sion warrants analysis because subsequent cases, including 
Sacco, which involve IIMD specifically mention or allude to 
Johnson. In Johnson, the Montana Supreme Court primarily 
treated mental distress as an element of damages, stating that 
plaintiff could recover when "tortious conduct results in a sub-
stantial invasion of a legally protected interest and causes a 
significant impact upon the person of the plaintiff."25 In several 
subsequent cases, the Montana Supreme Court recognized the 
20. See, e.g., Deitsch v. Tillary, 833 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Ark. 1992); Vicnire v. 
Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964). 
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); Harris v. Jones, 
380 A.2d 611, 616 (Md. 1977). 
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); Sacco, 271 Mont. 
at 234, 896 P.2d at 426. 
23. Randy J. Cox & Cynthia H. Shott, Boldly Into the Fog: Limiting Rights of 
Recovery for lnfiiction of Emotional Distress, 53 MONT. L. REV. 197 (1992); Francis X. 
Clinch & Jodie L. Johnson, Compensation of Emotional Distress in Montana: Distinc-
tions Between Bystanders and Direct Victims, 47 MONT. L. REV. 479 (1986). 
24. 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d 209 (1984). 
25. Johnson, 211 Mont. at 473, 686 P.2d at 213. 
104 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
existence of an independent cause of action of IIMD;26 however, 
the factual circumstances presented in those lawsuits would not 
substantiate a finding of liability.27 
Ill. ANALYSIS OF SACCO 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
In the Sacco case, plaintiff alleged that defendants, who 
were her former employers, had falsely supplied to the local 
police information claiming that she had "stolen proof sheets and 
photographs from" the defendant newspaper's offices.28 Plaintiff 
also asserted that defendants conspired to bring a criminal pros-
ecution against her, swore out a complaint against her which 
they knew was false, and falsely informed plaintiff's new employ-
er that she had stolen from defendants.29 Plaintiff claimed that 
defendants had harmed her reputation and caused her mental 
anguish. One of the five counts included in plaintiff's complaint 
alleged that defendants had intentionally caused her emotional 
distress. 
The Sacco opinion comprehensively treated the independent 
causes of action for negligent and intentional infliction of mental 
distress. The Montana Supreme Court initially examined the 
factual and procedural background of the case and then consid-
ered the count alleging a civil rights violation. The court next 
evaluated the tort of mental distress, discussing first the negli-
gent infliction and secondly the intentional infliction cause of 
action. The Montana Supreme Court recognized both claims as 
independent causes of action. Because the focus of this essay is 
IIMD, I only explore the court's treatment of negligent infliction 
of mental distress, insofar as it informs understanding of judicial 
application of the IIMD tort. For example, certain public policy 
concepts and the examination of severe mental distress which 
the Montana Supreme Court included in its discussion of the 
negligent infliction cause of action are equally applicable to 
IIMD. When those ideas can fairly be applied to the intentional 
infliction tort, I attempt to do so. 
In specifically treating IIMD, the court first reviewed three 
recent cases which it found to "stand for the proposition that in-
26. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
27. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
28. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 214, 896 P.2d at 414. 
29. Id. at 214, 896 P.2d at 414. 
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tentional infliction of emotional distress is recognized and can be 
pled as a separate cause of action in the courts of Montana."30 
The Montana Supreme Court then explained the respective re-
sponsibilities of the judge and jury in mental distress suits. It 
stated that the trial judge must initially ascertain whether the 
"plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to support a prima 
facie case for" IIMD.31 The jury must subsequently decide 
whether the defendant in fact committed the mental distress tort 
by consulting the evidence introduced.32 
The Montana Supreme Court next found that the traditional 
approach to IIMD could not be harmonized with the new stan-
dard which it had enunciated in recognizing the negligent in-
fliction cause of action. 33 The court, therefore, determined that 
it was preferable to require that plaintiffs prove the identical 
basic elements in both torts; there will be an independent cause 
of action for IIMD when "serious or severe emotional distress to 
the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
defendant's intentional act or omission."34 
The Montana Supreme Court rationalized in several ways 
its decision to impose the same essential proof requirements on 
plaintiffs who pursue both causes of action. The court stated that 
demanding an intentionally injured plaintiff to show that 
defendant's behavior was extreme and outrageous would place 
the justices in the "untenable position of requiring a higher stan-
dard of proof by plaintiffs" who pled intentional, than who pied 
negligent, infliction.35 The court derived support for its determi-
nation to impose identical proof demands in the two types of 
mental distress cases from Johnson v. Supersave Market. 36 The 
Montana Supreme Court repeated the rule that it gleaned from 
30. Id. at 235-36, 896 P.2d at 426-27; see also supra note 2; Lenee v. Hagadone 
Invest. Co., 258 Mont. 433, 444-45, 853 P.2d 1230, 1237-38 (1993); Davis v. Church 
of Jesus Christ, 258 Mont. 286, 293-94, 852 P.2d 640, 644-45 (1993); Lueck v. UPS, 
258 Mont. 2, 11, 851 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1993). It is interesting that nearly all of 
these cases involved the employment relationship, a phenomenon that was apparently 
driven by passage of the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act. See MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -915 (1995); see generally D. P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortification" of 
Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994). 
31. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 236, 896 P.2d at 427 (quoting Doohan v. Big Fork Sch. 
Dist. No. 38, 247 Mont. 125, 142, 805 P.2d 1354, 1365 (1991)). 
32. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 236, 896 P.2d at 427. 
33. Id. at 236, 896 P.2d at 427-28. 
34. Id. at 237, 896 P.2d at 428. 
35. Id. at 237, 896 P.2d at 427-28. 
36. 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d 209 (1984); Sacco, 271 Mont. at 237-38, 896 P.2d 
at 428. 
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Johnson: 
[D]amages for emotional distress are compensatory and there-
fore, the focus should be on the reasonable foreseeability that 
plaintiffs serious or severe emotional distress was the conse-
quence of the defendant's act or omission .... The defendant's 
culpability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress is 
"more properly considered when addressing the subject of puni-
tive damages."37 
The court concluded that the possibility of awarding punitive 
damages is the proper way to address the culpability and inten-
tional character of the defendant's behavior in an IIMD case.38 
The Montana Supreme Court's decision to require identical 
proof in negligent and intentional infliction cases departs signifi-
cantly from the approach that the vast majority of jurisdictions 
in the United States and the Restatement follow. Most courts 
and the Restatement require a plaintiff to prove that a 
defendant's intentional "extreme and outrageous conduct 'going 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community'"39 
caused plaintiffs severe mental distress. These jurisdictions and 
the Restatement have imposed this requirement principally to 
serve as a guarantee that the plaintiff has suffered actual harm 
and as a safeguard against fraudulent and frivolous claims. 
The Montana Supreme Court partially responded to these 
ideas and defended its decision to delete the extremely outra-
geous conduct element by enunciating the severe mental distress 
element of the tort. The court imposed on a plaintiff the require-
ment to "prove that the emotional distress suffered is 'serious' or 
'severe' in order to warrant recovery."40 It defined serious or 
severe distress by using and ostensibly adopting the explanation 
in comment j, Section 46 of the Restatement (Second). 
This articulation essentially states that the distress must be 
so severe that reasonable individuals could not be expected to 
endure it.41 The Restatement provides that severe mental dis-
37. Sacco, 271 Mont at 238, 896 P.2d at 428 (quoting Johnson, 211 Mont. at 
472, 696 P.2d at 213). 
38. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 238, 896 P.2d at 428. 
39. Foster v. Albertsons, Inc., 254 Mont. 117, 128-29, 835 P.2d 720, 728 (1992); 
see also supra notes 5, 14-16 and accompanying text; Sacco, 271 Mont. at 236-37, 
896 P.2d at 427 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1964)). 
40. See Sacco, 271 Mont. at 233, 896 P.2d at 426. 
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); see also Sacco, 271 
Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426. 
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tress "includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as 
fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, 
chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea."42 The Restate-
ment makes the intensity and duration of the distress "factors to 
be considered in determining its severity."43 The Restatement 
adds that the distress must be reasonable and that recovery for 
unreasonable or exaggerated distress will only be permitted 
when it results from a special susceptibility of which defendant 
was aware.44 
The Montana Supreme Court responded to the ideas about 
insuring that plaintiff has suffered real injury and guarding 
against false or frivolous lawsuits with the assertion that the 
requirement of serious or severe mental distress "alleviates any 
concern over a floodgate of claims, particularly fraudulent 
claims. "45 The court correspondingly stated that limiting recov-
ery to situations in which "plaintiff's serious or severe emotional 
distress was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
defendant's intentional act or omission alleviates the concern 
that defendants will be exposed to unlimited liability."46 
The Montana Supreme Court concluded the section of the 
Sacco opinion which articulated the IIMD cause of action with a 
brief summary. The court reiterated the elements of the mental 
distress tort which it had enunciated, that serious or severe 
mental distress would be defined by reference to comment j of 
Section 46 of the Restatement (Second), and the respective re-
sponsibilities of the judge and jury in these cases.47 
The Montana Supreme Court also elaborated upon certain 
ideas relevant to IIMD in the summary. The court explained that 
the difference between the intentional and negligent causes of 
action is in the "nature and culpability of the defendant's con-
duct" not in the torts' elements.48 The Montana Supreme Court 
stated that this distinction meant that a plaintiff who pleads 
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); see also Sacco, 271 
Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426. 
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); see also Sacco, 271 
Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426. 
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1964); see also Sacco, 271 
Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426; Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ, 258 Mont. 286, 306-
07, 852 P.2d 640, 652-53 (1993) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting); First Bank (N.A.) - Bill-
ings v. Clark, 236 Mont. 195, 206, 771 P.2d 84, 91 (1989). 
45. See Sacco, 271 Mont. at 237, 896 P.2d at 428. 
46. Id. 
47. See id. at 239, 896 P.2d at 429. 
48. Id. at 238-39, 896 P.2d at 429. 
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IIMD might request punitive damages under the Montana Code 
section providing therefor to "address the culpability of the 
defendant's conduct."49 
B. Commentary 
1. Improvements 
Several significant aspects of the Montana Supreme Court's 
decision in Sacco constitute improvements in the Montana law of 
IIMD. The court properly recognized that plaintiffs can plead 
and prove an independent cause of action for IIMD. It also cor-
rectly articulated the severe mental distress element of the claim 
by relying substantially on comment j of Section 46 of the Re-
statement (Second). Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court 
accurately delineated the roles of the trial judge and the jury in 
IIMD litigation. Furthermore, the court appropriately evinced 
concern about a floodgate of suits, especially fraudulent cases, 
and about the possibility of exposing defendants to unlimited 
liability by suggesting that its articulation of the severe mental 
distress element would be responsive to these potential prob-
lems. 
2. Areas of Potential Confusion 
A few important features of the Sacco opinion remain un-
clear or could be difficult for the Montana Supreme Court, Mon-
tana district judges and juries to apply. Perhaps most significant 
is the Montana Supreme Court's unnecessary omission of the 
extremely outrageous conduct element. Courts in the overwhelm-
ing majority of jurisdictions include this element and treat it as 
the gravamen of the cause of action. The requirement's elevated 
nature provides reasonable assurance that the defendant's be-
havior is egregious or at least out of the ordinary; that the con-
duct is sufficiently blameworthy to deserve punishment, an im-
portant purpose of the tort; that courts will not be inundated by 
a flood of claims, especially fraudulent suits; and that defendants 
will not be exposed to unlimited liability. 
The elevated character of the severe mental distress element 
affords similar assurance. Placing exclusive dependence on this 
element, however, relies too substantially on the degree of harm 
that the plaintiff has suffered, rather than the egregiousness of 
49. Id.; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220 (1995). 
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the defendant's behavior. Moreover, such dependence appears 
inadequate to treat the broad range of conduct that is at issue in 
IIMD claims and seems to afford insufficient protection against 
the possibility of a flood of suits and against the risk that defen-
dants will be exposed to open-ended liability. Depending solely 
on the severe mental distress element may also be inadequate to 
resolve cases which are brought by plaintiffs who are very vul-
nerable to suffering emotional harm. The articulation of this 
element by the Montana Supreme Court and in the Restatement 
(Second) does provide for such parties with the reasonable per-
son standard and by stating that individuals who are unduly 
sensitive as to their dignity will be unable to recover.50 
The omission of the extremely outrageous conduct element 
could also undercut important purposes of the IIMD cause of 
action. Significant objectives of this tort are to punish, deter, and 
ostensibly prevent the repetition of, certain kinds of behavior 
that the society considers intolerable, particularly by affording 
notice to individuals who might otherwise engage in such activi-
ty. The deletion of the extremely outrageous conduct element 
potentially deprives actors of guidance about what type of behav-
ior will expose them to liability for commission of the IIMD tort. 
The Montana Supreme Court stated that a defendant can be 
found liable for any intentional act or omission which this party 
could reasonably foresee would cause the plaintiff severe mental 
distress. That articulation lacks adequate rigor. The court corre-
spondingly deleted the intentional element of the cause of ac-
tion-the requirement that a defendant know with substantial 
certainty that defendant's act or omission will cause some result 
which the law regards as inappropriate. Nearly all jurisdictions 
include this as a significant element of IIMD, and intent is a 
fundamental prerequisite of intentional torts to persons and to 
property. For example, a plaintiff can only hold a defendant 
liable for battery, if the plaintiff shows that the defendant knew 
with substantial certainty that defendant's behavior would lead 
to offensive or harmful bodily contact with plaintiff. The Sacco 
court, in requiring only that a defendant reasonably foresee, 
rather than know with substantial certainty, that defendant's 
conduct would cause the plaintiff severe mental distress, import-
ed a concept traditionally applied to negligence and substituted 
it for a concept traditionally applied to intentional torts. 
A related area of confusion involves the Montana Supreme 
50. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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Court's attempt to justify its assimilation of the IIMD cause of 
action to the negligent infliction tort. This confusion arises partly 
from the court's statements that the difference between the two 
versions lies in the "nature and culpability of the defendant's 
conduct," so that plaintiffs alleging IIMD may request punitive 
damages to address culpability, and that mental distress damag-
es are compensatory and, therefore, the focus should be on rea-
sonable foreseeability.51 With all due respect, courts have tra-
ditionally stated that compensatory and punitive damages may 
be awarded for either intentionally or negligently inflicted men-
tal distress when the elements of the respective torts or the 
requirements of applicable punitive damages statutes are satis-
fied. Plaintiffs will more frequently recover punitive damages in 
intentional, than negligent, infliction cases because the tradition-
al judicial articulation of the extremely outrageous conduct ele-
ment of IIMD more closely resembles the type of behavior which 
supports punitive damage awards. 
The extremely outrageous conduct element as traditionally 
applied and the kind of activity identified as deserving punish-
ment in the Montana punitive damages statute, however, are not 
identical. Considerable behavior that could satisfy the extremely 
outrageous conduct element might not constitute actual fraud or 
actual malice as required by the Montana legislation. 52 In com-
parison, the behavior of a defendant which is at issue in negli-
gent infliction of mental distress cases may occasionally support 
punitive damages awards. For example, the drunk driver who 
seriously injures schoolchildren by speeding through a school 
zone or by striking a school bus could be liable to parents who 
witnessed these accidents for negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress and perhaps for punitive damages. 
It is easy to understand why numerous courts and commen-
tators have confused the concepts examined above. This area of 
substantive law is relatively nascent, complex and unclear. The 
Montana Supreme Court was apparently exhibiting a laudable 
concern for facilitating recovery by plaintiffs who have suffered 
mental distress that defendants have negligently or intentionally 
inflicted. There is also a sense in which compensatory damages 
seem to implicate reasonable foreseeability and punitive damag-
es appear to implicate intent because negligent behavior is gen-
51. See Sacco, 271 Mont. at 239, 896 P.2d at 429. 
52. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(1) (1995). 
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erally less reprehensible than intentional conduct.53 Moreover, 
the extremely outrageous conduct element of IIMD is quite gen-
eral and has defied very precise definition, leading numerous 
courts to express or evince discomfort with the open-ended char-
acter of this aspect of the tort. 
I believe, however, that the preferable approach is to main-
tain distinct causes of action, and to articulate different ele-
ments, for negligent and intentional infliction of mental distress. 
It is also advisable to retain the intent, rather than foreseeabili-
ty, and the extremely outrageous conduct elements of IIMD 
which the vast majority of courts in the country have traditional-
ly applied. Moreover, plaintiffs should be able to recover punitive 
damages in negligent as well as intentional infliction cases when 
the defendant's behavior satisfies the requirements imposed in 
the punitive damages statute. 
The Montana Supreme Court should continue relying on the 
severe mental distress element of the tort as articulated in 
Sacco, which the court principally derived from the Restatement 
(Second). The Montana Supreme Court may want to afford addi-
tional guidance on those aspects of the Restatement formulation 
which trial judges should apply in particular situations, while 
district judges must concomitantly decide what features of the 
Restatement enunciation apply to specific cases, pending the re-
ceipt of additional instruction. For example, highly unpleasant 
mental reactions, such as horror, differ substantially from cha-
grin and worry. 54 
The broad range of factual circumstances that can be at 
issue in IIMD causes of action, however, could complicate efforts 
to supply greater specificity. It may also be advisable for district 
judges to have the flexibility that a multifaceted standard af-
fords. For instance, when a defendant has participated in very 
egregious conduct, judges might require less by way of the sever-
ity of mental distress which the plaintiff has suffered. 
In sum, the Montana Supreme Court has significantly im-
proved the application of the law of IIMD in Montana with issu-
ance of the Sacco opinion. The court correctly recognized the 
independent cause of action, properly articulated the severe 
mental distress element, and appropriately delineated the re-
spective roles of the judge and jury in IIMD cases. There is some 
remaining confusion in the jurisprudence of IIMD, particularly 
53. See Givelber, supra note 7, at 54-55. 
54. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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regarding deletion of the intent and extremely outrageous con-
duct elements and treatment of the concept of punitive damages. 
The final section of this essay, therefore, affords several sugges-
tions which are principally intended to clarify ideas that could 
lead to confusion in the future. The recommendations warrant 
relatively brief examination here because most of the proposals 
have been specifically mentioned or implicitly addressed above. 
Nonetheless, a number of the concepts require additional sub-
stantiation and some deserve elaboration. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTURE 
The Montana Supreme Court should retain those features of 
the Sacco decision which the above analysis suggested are clear 
and appropriate. These aspects include the court's articulation of 
the respective roles of the trial judge and the jury in IIMD cases 
and its enunciation of the severe mental distress element of the 
tort. They also encompass the Montana Supreme Court's appar-
ent subscription to important underlying public policy reasons 
for the independent cause of action, such as facilitating plaintiffs' 
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages and punishing 
and deterring defendants' egregious behavior and the court's 
expression of concern about a flood of fraudulent claims and 
about exposing defendants to unlimited liability. 
The Montana Supreme Court and district judges might want 
to refine the articulation of the severe mental distress element of 
the IIMD tort. For instance, they could identify precisely which 
aspects of the multifaceted Restatement (Second) formulation 
should apply. Nonetheless, the preferable approach may be to 
retain the enunciation in Sacco, with sensitive case-by-case dis-
trict judge application of the specific factors which seem most 
appropriate in particular cases. This could be better because trial 
judges might need the flexibility afforded by those features of the 
Restatement that the Sacco court reproduced and seemingly 
adopted. 
The Montana Supreme Court should modify the aspects of 
the Sacco opinion which the above evaluation indicated are un-
necessary or confusing. Most important, the court should include 
the intent and extremely outrageous elements of the cause of 
action in the Montana articulation. The Montana Supreme Court 
can rely substantially on those elements as enunciated in the 
Restatement (Second) and by many other state supreme courts. 
For example, extremely outrageous conduct could be defined in 
terms of behavior that exceeds all bounds tolerated in a civilized 
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society. If that articulation is overly broad, the Montana Su-
preme Court can derive greater specificity from the two major 
categories, abuse of relation and special susceptibility, into which 
numerous IIMD cases fit. Reliance on the intent element enunci-
ated in terms of the classic formulation of knowledge with sub-
stantial certainty means that the court should delete the concept 
of reasonable foreseeability because it more properly applies to 
negligence. 
The Montana Supreme Court should also clarify the treat-
ment of punitive damages in the Sacco decision. It ought to state 
clearly that a plaintiff may seek and recover punitive damages 
for intentionally and negligently inflicted harm when the plain-
tiff proves that the defendant participated in conduct which 
satisfies the standards of actual malice or actual fraud pre-
scribed in the Montana punitive damages statute. 
The Montana Supreme Court should clarify the jurispru-
dence of IIMD in these ways for all of the reasons specifically 
expressed and implicitly stated already. Several ideas treated 
above deserve elaboration, while additional concepts support the 
recommendations that I have offered. One important justification 
is that the modifications proposed would align the Montana 
jurisprudence of IIMD more closely with the law applied by most 
other jurisdictions in the United States and with the Restate-
ment (Second). 
I am not suggesting that Montana subscribe to the national 
articulation of IIMD merely because many states have done so. I 
simply believe that the jurisprudence suggested will be clearer, 
and easier for the Montana Supreme Court, district judges and 
juries to apply, than the enunciation in Sacco. Moreover, the 
recommendations afforded will yield similar substantive results 
in that deserving plaintiffs should be able to recover with nearly 
equal facility. 
The changes suggested will also afford protection against the 
possibility of a flood of litigation, especially involving fraud, and 
the prospect that plaintiffs and their counsel will rely too sub-
stantially on the IIMD tort. Indeed, the cause of action as articu-
lated in Sacco appears so open-ended and so easy to prove that 
plaintiffs and their attorneys may be tempted to include a count 
alleging IIMD in many cases in which the allegation would prob-
ably not be warranted under the cause of action as traditionally 
enunciated. This possibility could confuse the law, lead to the 
pursuit of unjustifiable claims, unnecessarily complicate cases, 
and waste the resources of judges, lawyers, parties and juries. 
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Finally, certain of these recommendations should also clarify and 
make more cohesive the law of intentional torts and the broader 
substantive area of torts in Montana. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Montana Supreme Court has properly recognized the 
independent cause of action for intentional infliction of mental 
distress in the important Sacco case. The court has appropriately 
treated numerous aspects of the law of the mental distress tort; 
however, certain features of the decision are unclear. The court 
should promptly clarify those dimensions of the opinion which 
remain confused, thereby facilitating application of the IIMD 
cause of action in Montana. 
